Many studies of the Room to Maneuver make no provision for popular evaluation of policy. They assert rather than demonstrate popular satisfaction with policy choices and macroeconomic outcomes. We present a framework that explicitly models channels for popular preferences to influence policies and outcomes. Our results for economic policymaking in Britain do not support the Room to Maneuver thesis. In our sample (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)) the British government was responsive to changes in political evaluations, and its policy choices effectively fed back into popular evaluations of government policy. However, this accountability mechanism worked outside the real economy. Shifts in popular evaluations induced changes in policy but had no impact on inflation and economic growth. Government capacity to shape macroeconomic outcomes was limited and popular influence over economic policy was ineffectual. This form of accountability probably existed because British citizens had difficulty gauging the real impacts of their government's policies.
Introduction
Most scholars now agree that, despite globalization, national governments have substantial room to maneuver in economic policy and macroeconomic outcomes. Studies show that, contrary to earlier pessimistic predictions, policies have not been converging in advanced industrialized countries (see, among others, Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Mosley 2000; Quinn 1997; Swank and Steinmo 2002) . From this evidence, researchers conclude that governments still are able to produce distinct economic outcomes and retain considerable control over their macroeconomies. Thus, elected officials are accountable for their decisions. Through political participation, citizens evaluate their representatives' policies and hold them accountable for them.
This wisdom rests on very weak footings. Studies of the room to maneuver make no provision for popular evaluation of policy: they assert rather than demonstrate popular satisfaction with policy choices and macroeconomic outcomes.
1 Most omit channels for popular preference feedback into policies and outcomes (see, e.g., Clark and Hallerberg 2000) . Thus we lack an understanding of the causal chains that connect policy choices to macroeconomic outcomes, to popular evaluations, and then back again to policy choices. Extant work fails to draw distinctions between short-and medium-term consequences of policy choice, and to provide any estimates of the magnitudes and durations of policy outcomes. Without scientifically sound estimates of these outcomes, we have no idea how much, if any, room to maneuver democratic governments retain.
We develop a framework that addresses these issues. It is genuinely interdisciplinary since it endogenizes both the open economy and the polity. We use current research-from new open macroeconomics, government approval research and the political economy of financial markets-to identify this model. We then extract three competing arguments about the causal chains that connote popular sovereignty over the economy. Using a Bayesian structural time series model we test these arguments. The test-bed for our analysis is the United Kingdom, a political economy distinctive for being highly open to trade and finance and producing a high degree of clarity of responsibility for its governments. If political accountability exists anywhere in the OECD, it ought to exist in this critical case (see, e.g., Mosley 2000) .
Our results do not support the Room to Maneuver thesis or its application to the UK.
They are only partly consistent with past research about the existence of political accountability in open economies. In our sample (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) ) the British government was responsive to changes in political evaluations, specifically sociotropic economic expectations. Its policy choices fed back into popular evaluations of government policy, particularly vote intentions. A visible link from popular evaluations to policy and back to popular evaluations existed. There is evidence, consistent with theoretical work on political monetary cycles (e.g., Lohmann 1999) that prices but not output increased before elections. Net of this electoral effect, the accountability mechanism was outside the real economy. Shifts in popular evaluations of the British government induced policy changes that had no impact on inflation and economic growth. This suggests, contrary to past research, that government capacity to shape macroeconomic outcomes was limited and popular influence over economic policy was ineffectual. This accountability probably existed because British citizens had difficulty gauging the real impacts of government policies.
Connecting the Polity and the Economy: Competing Views of Popular Accountability
Models of economic voting are a natural starting point for analyzing the connections among popular evaluations, government policy and economic outcomes. In these models, voters continuously evaluate the economic outcomes of government policy and hold policymakers accountable for them (Clarke et al. 2004; Erikson et al. 2002; Lewis-Beck 1988) . When objective economic indicators suggest that the economy is good, subjective evaluations become more favorable (Sanders 1991 ). 2 These subjective evaluations then are transmitted to vote intentions both directly and via prime ministerial approval (Clarke et al. 2000; Clarke and Stewart 1995; Clarke et al. 1998; Sanders 1991; 2005; Sanders et al. 1993) .
While these studies ignore feedback from the polity to the economy, recent research in open macroeconomics yields detailed insights about how government policy influences the macroeconomy. Analyses of theoretical models with inflexible prices and monopolistic competition suggest that monetary policy may affect both domestic and foreign economic performance (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995) . Empirical analyses show that monetary contractions lead to persistent increases in exchange rates (Clarida and Galí 1994; Eichenbaum and Evans 1995) . The impact of policy on the real economy is more ambiguous. While some researchers find a considerable effect of a monetary shock on domestic and foreign output (Betts and Devereux 2001; Kim 2001) , others find that this effect is rather small (Cushman and Zha 1997) .
This research in political science and economics illuminates the workings of the polity and the economy, but the connections between them in economically open democratic systems are not well understood. 3 The political monetary (business) cycle literature generally studies closed economies and equates popular accountability with electoral politics. How fast governments react to changes in popular evaluations is usually an assumption in a formal model rather than an empirical question. There is consensus that these reactions are inflationary, but policy has little lasting effect on the real economy (Lohmann 1999 The immediate and lagged effects of decreasing interest rates on subjective evaluations and political approval are small or not existent in this second chain. First, these variables may not react to policy instantaneously (Sanders 1991) . The delayed impact of low interest rates on political variables is offset as voters infer from a declining exchange rate that future inflation will rise. Voters then expect a decrease in real wages, depressing same-period subjective economic expectations. At times, the exchange rate has a symbolic value reflecting the overall strength of a country (Hibbs 1982) . A falling exchange rate then has negative, contemporaneous effects on evaluation of government policymaking. Finally, the effect of policy on the real economy does not persist and policy change does not have lagged effects on either subjective or objective political evaluations. Policy reflects citizens' preferences but it is not able to bring about citizens' preferred macroeconomic outcomes. There is no meaningful room to maneuver in this case.
In the third causal chain government is a responsive and an influential actor in the political economy. Government constantly monitors citizens' preferences through opinion polls, voting and political participation, and reacts instantaneously to changes in political evaluations. If the government learns that the public is dissatisfied with the economy, it adjusts policy immediately to alter economic outcomes consistent with citizens' preferences. Government policy is effective because the domestic real economy adjusts to political shocks only slowly.
Economic rigidities imply that government-if it reacts fast enough-can lead the real economy and effectively respond to changes in political evaluations. Although private actors, such as firms and wage setters, anticipate the government's reaction to a political shock, they are bound by contracts and cannot adjust prices instantaneously. When economic actors in the real sector adjust with a delay the effect of government policy on output is strong and persistent (Galí 2003) .
International economic integration reinforces the effect of policy on the economy. arrows mean there is a weak, delayed, or no effect from one variable to another. The grey arrows imply that there is a strong and persistent effect. In the No Accountability Model, government does not react to changes in political evaluations. In the second, Policy Response Model, the government reacts to shocks in evaluations. This policy change does not influence economic activity and there is no feedback. In the Accountability Model, government reacts to changes in political evaluations. Evaluations and the economy adjust when the government changes policy.
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Research Design

Case and Data
We test the competing claims about political accountability in open economies using multivariate time series analysis of monthly economic and political data for the United Kingdom from 1981 to 1997. This case is well suited for this analysis since Britain has a high clarity of responsibility and a history of openness to trade and capital flows. Mosley (2000: 751) argues that British elections in the 1990s were meaningful contests between parties with contending views about how Britain should exploit its room to maneuver in the world economy.
Compared to other industrialized democracies, the British system largely concentrates political power in the hands of the central government. Its majority-plurality electoral system produces single-party governments that are fairly independent of other political actors. Unlike countries where two or more coalition partners participate in government, there is little hidden bargaining among the parties during the policy formulation process that makes it difficult for voters to assign the final policy decision to a single, specific political player. The absence of vertical division of power and the unicameral legislature offer political opponents few opportunities to alter government policies (see Powell and Whitten 1993) .
Moreover, the British government had full control over economic policymaking during the period of analysis. During the first half of the 1990s, the incumbent Conservative Party proportion of people who expect the national economic situation will improve and the proportion of people who think that the situation will worsen. To capture electoral dynamics, we use an electoral counter taking (resetting to) the value 1 in the month after each British general election and increasing linearly to the next general election. We also estimated specifications without such a counter and with three counters for the different electoral periods in our time period. 
Model and Structural Identification
To test the competing claims about the degree of political accountability in open economies, we use Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregressive Regression (B-SVAR) models.
These are appropriate for a problem like ours where model scale, endogeneity, persistence, and specification uncertainty are present at the same time. B-SVAR models subsume more familiar models like VARs, ECMs, and VECMs allowing for sounder statistical inferences, e.g., the avoidance of knife-edge inferences about unit roots. 8 Details of the general B-SVAR model are described elsewhere (Brandt and Freeman 2006a; 2006b ).
In a B-SVAR model, our discussion of competing causal accounts of political accountability is represented by different contemporaneous and lagged relationships among the variables. The political and economic literatures imply a core set of relationships between variables within the polity and the economy. Each competing causal account (chain) implies different contemporaneous relationships across the polity and economy: the immediate impact of political shocks on economic variables and the immediate impact of economic shocks on political variables. Inferences about the direction, magnitude, and duration of shocks in key variables can be made on the basis of the impulse responses of the B-SVAR models. These impulse responses reveal the combined impact of contemporaneous and lagged relationships between the political and economic variables in the three structural specifications. We rely on government approval research in Britain (Clarke et al. 2000; Clarke and Stewart 1995; Clarke et al. 1998; Sanders 1991; 2005) to identify the core political model in the lower right corner of each model in Table 1 . The literature suggests that a lower-triangularized, contemporaneous order of SE t , PE t , PM t and VI t is appropriate. The single-equation models of government approval used by researchers imply that both sociotropic and personal subjective economic expectations affect approval and vote intentions contemporaneously. 9 These political models suggest that Prime Minister (PM) satisfaction instantaneously influences vote intentions.
At the same time, PM satisfaction is weakly exogenous to vote intentions implying that there is no contemporaneous effect of VI t on PM t . These models also imply that citizens learn about objective economic indicators in the Production sector only with a delay.
10
Following empirical models in macroeconomics, we divide the open economy into three sectors of equations that differ in terms of how fast they adjust to shocks in the other variables (Leeper et al. 1996) . Variables in the "Information Sector" adjust to shocks instantaneously and include financial markets. These markets process new information about changes in other sectors very quickly. For all three competing causal chains the Information Sector reacts instantaneously to shocks in the macropolity (Bernhard and Leblang 2006) . We do not require that policy is weakly exogenous. The "Policy Sector" represents the government reaction functions and specifies the variables to which policymakers respond immediately. Variables in the "Production Sector", economic output and prices, adjust sluggishly to shocks in other variables.
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We rely on work by Cushman and Zha (1997) and Sims and Zha (2006) Table 1 .
11
The three competing causal accounts depicted in Figure 1 now can be represented as three distinct contemporaneous specifications, or three distinct contemporaneous causal structures in B-SVAR models. The identification of the polity-economy intersections (the grey-shaded areas)
in the upper part of Table 1 The second model in Table 1 The third "Accountability Model"-the model that is necessary for any Room to Maneuver-allows for additional free parameters relative to both the No Accountability and the Policy Response models. This model holds that governments react immediately to political shocks and that policy choices are immediately evaluated and feedback through the Macropolity.
The A's in Table 1 represent the additional free parameters that are necessary to allow for such contemporaneous government reaction and feedback. The Accountability model thus has four (eight) more free parameters than the Policy Response (No Accountability) models.
Results
We estimated B-SVAR models for the three structural identifications. Since the model is Bayesian, we employ an informed prior for Bayesian SVARs (Brandt and Freeman 2006a; 2006b; Sims and Zha 1998) . 13 The model is estimated using a Gibbs sampler proposed by Waggoner and Zha (2003) . (for details, see Brandt and Freeman 2006a; 2006b ).
We use the log marginal data density (MDD) to assess the posterior model fit of the three models. The log MDD measures the log density for the sample data under each model. 14 Overall, the Bayes factors indicate that there is substantially higher probability that the Accountability model better explains the data than the other two models.
One should not judge the explanatory power of a B-SVAR solely on these fit statistics (Brandt and Freeman 2006b) . The main inferential tool should be impulse response analysisanalyzing the speeds and magnitudes of adjustment of policy to politics and adjustment of politics to policy over time. Impulse responses trace out the dynamic responses to shocks to the various equations in the political-economic system. This is critical to showing the macroeconomic consequences of any political accountability that might have existed in Britain in this period. In a B-SVAR model, the initial responses follow a contemporaneous causal structure based on the structural identification for each model. The evolution of dynamic response of a shock to an equation is then traced out using the reduced form dynamics of the estimated model.
All of the dynamic responses presented here are median estimates in percentage points over 12 months with 68% (pointwise) highest posterior density regions (Brandt and Freeman 2006b These responses summarize part of the causal chain from economic policy to popular evaluations. Response model this same shock causes interest rates to decline. In the Accountability model, surprise increases in sociotropic expectation lead to a positive and more lasting increases in interest rates. The Accountability model result is most plausible, since expectations that the economy will improve put pressure on policymakers to raise interest rates (to stave off inflation).
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The response of UK interest rates to shocks in subjective personal expectations (PE t ) generally is negative. For the No Accountability model, interest rates decline with a 68% confidence region that is below zero. For the Policy Response and Accountability models, the median responses are negative, but the confidence regions always include zero. Thus, omitting endogenous interest rate responses to personal expectation shocks leads to the incorrect inference that interest rates respond negatively when there is likely no response. Models that assume that the policy is exogenous of the polity are subject to an endogeneity error and produce biased inferences about the response of policy to politics.
In [ Figure 3 about here]
In contrast, the responses of the political variables to interest rate shocks (IR t )-direct evidence of accountability-are consistent with public reacts to economic policy. The sociotropic expectations, personal expectations, and prime ministerial satisfaction equations do not respond to interest rate innovations in any of the models. For the No Accountability and Policy Response models where no contemporaneous accountability or endogenous feedback from policy to politics is specified, shocks to interest rates produce no lagged change in vote intentions. The response of the vote intentions equation in the Accountability model provides direct evidence of reactions to policy. For the accountability chain that allows for contemporaneous endogeneity from policy to vote intentions, a positive one standard deviation shock to interest rates leads to a decline in vote intentions. This drop is large and constant at nearly -0.05 points for each of the twelve months in the response horizon. Cumulatively this is a substantial change, since it means that over 12 months it accounts for more than half a point change in vote intentions.
The responses of the political variables to exchange and interest rate shocks in Figure 3 show that policy changes generate a response in the public evaluations of government. But this causal mechanism is apparent only in a model that explicitly allows for contemporaneous accountability. From the interest rates responses to the political variables in Figure 2 , assuming that there is exogeneity from the economic policy variables to the political variables as in the No Accountability and Policy Response models lead to findings that politics does not respond to policy. In fact, allowing for contemporaneous effects interest rate shocks produce changes in vote intentions.
Key links in the economic-politics causal chain in the Room to Maneuver debate are the impact of policy on the real economy and of the real economy on the political variables. Figure 4 shows the responses of UK CPI t and IIP t to changes in UK interest rates. These responses are central to economists' claims about the effects of policy in the presence of price stickiness and nominal rigidities. All three models produce the same inferences for monetary policy. Positive interest rate increases lead to small (less than 0.0002%) increases in prices and output with confidence regions spanning zero. This is consistent with Sims and Zha (2006) who found relatively weak effects of unexpected monetary policy changes on the real economy in the U. S.
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The final component of the accountability causal chain is the impact of the real economy on the polity. Earlier political science work showed that the impacts of the real economy were small relative to the impacts of the expectational, approval and vote intention variables all the while assuming that economy was exogenous of the polity. In our models with endogenous economic and political linkages, the impacts of the real economy can be evaluated after accounting for the documented endogenous relationships for the economic policy and politics. The Policy Response model assumes that the macropolity is weakly exogenous to the real economy and policy. Including contemporaneous policy endogeneity-as in the Accountability model-the real effects of inflation on the polity are zero.
18
The exogenous election counter(s) may capture the impacts of politics on the economy.
Each of the 11 equations includes an exogenous election counter; so the responses described above are net of these electoral trends. We also estimated models 1) without any electoral trends and 2) with separate counters for each electoral period. For each election counter specification, the Accountability model fits best. There is no evidence of any impact of policy on the real macroeconomy in the Accountability model, regardless of the electoral counter specification. The density estimates for the single election counter coefficients are identical across the three models. Lohmann's model predicts that prices, but not output, respond to election cycles. Our election counter densities support these predictions. But the main point is that the non-electoral dynamics reveal no lasting real, macroeconomic effects of political accountability (Figure 4) . So, political accountability exists outside the real economy: a condition for the room to maneuver is not met.
Conclusion
Scholars repeatedly point to Britain as a case where the government enjoyed significant room to maneuver during the period of analysis (e.g., Mosley 2000) . Thus, political accountability existed in that the British government effectively used this room to maneuver and continuously produced economic outcomes consistent with the wishes of British citizens.
Our results are only partially consistent with this argument. We find that British governments reacted to changes in subjective expectations about future national economic development. The public can induce changes in government policy and thus exerts some influence over policymaking. Voters then reward the government for its policies and the proportion of citizens intending to vote for the incumbent government increases. But there is no evidence that the government can effectively influence real economic outcomes. Therefore the accountability mechanism works outside the real economy. In terms of the full relationship between the economy and the polity described in Figure 1 , there is no transmission of policy through the economy to popular evaluations. The links from policy to the economy and from the economy to popular evaluations are missing, at least in the short-and medium term. We did not examine the effects of the reforms during Tory incumbency on long-run growth and inflation, i.e. over a decade or more. The ability of the Tory government to spur long-run growth in the 1980s and 90s may be interpreted as a form of long-run accountability. But it is unlikely that citizens' time horizons cover a decade or even more when they evaluate the performance of their government.
There are several explanations for our finding. One is that British citizens rewarded their government for policies that affected their personal situation more than for impacts on the macroeconomy. But like Clarke et al., (2004) we included a variable for Personal Expectations (PE t ). In the Accountability model it shows no response to exchange or interest rate policy 1 Empirical evidence does not support his claim, since majorities in European countries do not think that their governments have enough control over macroeconomic outcomes (European Commission 2003; Freeman 2006; Hellwig 2006a; 2006b) . Existing research does not answer the question why citizens lose their faith in their governments' capacity to shape economic developments when these governments are generating economic outcomes that citizens' desire.
2 The objective measures generally are unemployment or economic growth, inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate (Bernhard and Leblang 2006: chapter 8; Hibbs 1982; Sanders 1991) .
Subjectives indicators include subjective personal financial and sociotropic economic expectations and retrospections (Clarke and Stewart 1995; Sanders 1991) . 3 Freeman and Houser (1998) present dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that combine the polity and the economy, but this model is for closed economies. On the governments' central bank accountability studies see Leeper and Sterne (2002) . 5 We tested whether UK and German interest rates were cointegrated. The results were ambiguous for the first half of the sample, specifically until German unification in 1990 and the EMS crisis in 1992. In the latter period, we did not find evidence that UK and German interest rates were cointegrated. Tests suggest that the series were not cointegrated for the full sample.
6 Our model reveals political dynamics that exist beyond the episodic impacts of elections. We report tests of the alternative specifications of the electoral counter below. To some degree, the timing of elections in Britain is endogenous. Future research could analyze this issue.
